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NO UNIVERSAL TARGET: 
DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN 
TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS IN TARGETED 
SANCTIONS REGIMES 
INTRODUCTION 
n December 14, 2012,1 the White House enacted the 
“Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei 
Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act,”2 a seemingly in-
nocuous piece of international trade legislation with an un-
precedented attachment (the “Bill”). The Bill’s formal purpose 
was to establish “permanent normal trade relations” with Rus-
sia, following Russia’s admission to the World Trade Organiza-
tion (“WTO”).3 During negotiations, however, a certain title of 
the Bill—that section called “the Magnitsky Act”—dominated 
the floor.4 The Magnitsky Act empowered the U.S. president to 
“determine[], based on credible information,” that individual 
Russian citizens had violated international human rights, and 
to then place them on a blacklist—starting with Russian offi-
cials associated with the imprisonment and death of Russian 
                                                                                                             
 1. Stephen Collinson, Obama Signs Russia Rights Law Despite Putin 
Fury, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 14, 2012, available at 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ifTJR_NiuSC0kkGDg
BkKJjDDYSqQ?docId=CNG.1a7e217111e4906ef1b6b3e54e79e1b0.141. 
 2. Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule 
of Law Accountability Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-208, §§ 401–406. 
 3. Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountabil-
ity Act §§ 101–102; accord Jeremy W. Peters, U.S. Senate Passes Russian 
Trade Bill, With a Human Rights Caveat, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2012, at B4. See 
also Madeleine Albright & Igor Ivanov, A New Agenda for U.S.-Russia Coop-
eration, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2012), 
www.nytimes.com/2012/12/31/opinion/31iht-edalbright31.html (calling for 
renewed attempts at cooperation in recognition of the states’ mutual inter-
ests). The Jackson-Vanik Amendment adopted in 1974, imposed trade re-
strictions on Russia, denying Russia most-favored-nation status due to its 
emigration policy that severely restricted the movement of Jewish Russian 
nationals. Steven Lee Myers & David M. Herszenhorn, Clinton Tells Russia 
that Sanctions Will Soon End, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2012, at A4; see infra Part 
I.B.ii. 
 4. Peters, supra note 3. 
O
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lawyer Sergei Magnitsky.5 These violators6 were prohibited 
from entering the United States, and any of their existing as-
sets within U.S. jurisdiction were frozen.7 The Kremlin8 re-
sponded with Yakolev’s Law, which included sanctions against 
U.S. citizens connected to mistreatment of Russian children 
adopted by Americans.9 
These pieces of legislation have created targeted sanctions: 
instruments of a state’s foreign policy “that are designed and 
implemented in such a way as to affect only those parties that 
are held responsible for wrongful, unacceptable, illegal, or rep-
rehensible behavior,” including individuals, legal entities, and 
other non-state actors that violate international law.10 Target-
ed sanctions are “an alternative to comprehensive sanctions” 
that are directed at a state as a whole and “that affect entire 
populations.”11 Although targeting an individual foreign na-
tional is not a wholly unprecedented foreign policy measure 
(being widely practiced against suspected terrorists in the last 
couple decades), the application of such measures against sus-
pected human rights violators represents a deviation from ac-
                                                                                                             
 5. Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountabil-
ity Act §§ 401–406. 
 6. Throughout this Note, there is a semantical difficulty regarding the 
term “human rights violators” as generally used. On the one hand, because 
the individuals were not formally convicted after a fair hearing in accordance 
with their rights under international law (discussed in Parts I and II), their 
guilt ought not to be assumed, and they would be properly referred to as “al-
leged” violators. However, the state actors here treat the individuals as con-
victs by inflicting punishment upon them. Therefore “human rights violators” 
in this Note refers to these accused individuals, bearing in mind these differ-
ent perspectives and specifying which perspective is relevant where appro-
priate. 
 7. Peters, supra note 3. 
 8. The Moscow Kremlin, locus of the Russian Federation government. See 
David M. Herszenhorn & Andrew E. Kramer, Russian Adoption Ban Brings 
Uncertainty and Outrage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/29/world/europe/russian-adoption-ban-
brings-uncertainty-and-outrage.html. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Anthonius W. de Vries, European Union Sanctions against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia from 1998 to 2000: A Special Exercise in Targeting, in 
SMART SANCTIONS: TARGETING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 87 (David Cortright & 
George A. Lopez eds., 2002). 
 11. Joanna Weschler, The Evolution of Security Council Innovations in 
Sanctions, 65 INT’L J. 31, 39 (2010). 
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cepted principles of human rights and sovereignty in interna-
tional law. 
All types of economic sanctions have gained popularity since 
the 1990s.12 Sanctions are “the tool of choice for the [United 
Nations Security C]ouncil in addressing threats to, or breaches 
of, international peace and security around the world,”13 be-
cause they are seen as a nonviolent instrument of foreign poli-
cy.14 Not all international organizations use sanctions regular-
ly, however. The WTO, for example, has sought to deter the use 
of sanctions by its member states by requiring them to pursue 
resolutions to conflicts through arbitration within the WTO it-
self.15 
                                                                                                             
 12. In one study, researchers observed fifty-eight sanctions cases from 
1990–1999, compared to thirty-two from 1980–1989, and only fourteen from 
1914–1944. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg, Reconciling Political 
Sanctions with Globalization and Free Trade: Economic Sanctions: Public 
Goals and Private Compensation, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 305, 307 tbl. 1 (2003). 
 13. Jane Boulden & Andrea Charron, Evaluating UN Sanctions: New 
Ground, New Dilemmas, and Unintended Consequences, 65 INT’L J. 1, 7 
(2010). See also Nikolay Marinov, Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country 
Leaders?, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 564, 564 (2005) (observing that “[i]n the last 
decade, virtually nowhere could democratic rights and freedoms be suspend-
ed, human rights grossly abused, or a civil war break out without causing a 
group of states to react with economic sanctions”). 
 14. Economic restrictions appeared, on their face, to be less harmful than 
military intervention. This idea was occasionally referred to as the “Wilsoni-
an notion,” attributed to President Woodrow Wilson. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, 
Policy Brief 98-4: Sanctions-Happy USA, PETERSON INST. INT’L ECON. (July 
1998), available at 
http://www.piie.com/publications/pb/pb.cfm?ResearchID=83. President Wil-
son’s opinion of sanctions was not wholly positive, however. As quoted by Pro-
fessor W. Michael Reisman in a 2008 address, the president elaborated: 
A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. 
Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will 
be no need for force. It is a terrible remedy. It does not cost a life out-
side the nation boycotted, but it brings oppression upon the nation, 
which in my judgment no modern nation could resist. 
W. Michael Reisman, Yale L. Sch., Sanctions and International Law, Keynote 
Address at the Intercultural Human Rights Law Review Annual Symposium 
(Oct. 24, 2008), in 4 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 9, 12 (2009). 
 15. In comparison, WTO procedures favor “removal of trade barriers found 
to be inconsistent with covered agreements rather than imposition of a sec-
ond trade barrier in retaliation.” ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW 167 (2nd ed. 2008). Should a trade dispute arise, the Under-
standing on Dispute Settlement prohibits members from making an inde-
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Recent international litigation has prompted analysts to re-
examine the legality of targeted economic sanctions under ac-
cepted principles of international law. The methods employed 
by sending states16—usually freezing an individual’s or entity’s 
assets within the sanctioning party’s jurisdiction, or denying a 
visa—generally lack the necessary elements to protect interna-
tionally recognized human rights principles and comply with 
customary international law. In the terrorism context, for ex-
ample, U.N.-supported targeted sanctions that have frozen the 
assets of individuals associated with terrorism can directly vio-
late the individuals’ due process rights. Following substantial 
amounts of international litigation,17 and with the advice of 
numerous academic conferences,18 the U.N. Security Council 
(the “Security Council”) attempted to preserve due process by 
creating procedures by which a targeted individual would have 
recourse against the U.N.-authorized sanctions regime.19 Sev-
eral scholars believe that the efforts are “positive step[s] to-
ward addressing the serious institutional problems that are 
inherent in the individual sanctions,” but “not commensurate 
                                                                                                             
pendent determination that their rights under an agreement have been de-
nied, instead requiring them to employ the WTO’s extensive arbitration op-
tions toward its resolution. The existence of viable options for dissatisfied 
parties “reduce[s] substantially the justification for unilateral trade remedies, 
and also increase[s] the downside risk” for the state using such “an unauthor-
ized sanction which would itself violate a covered agreement.”  The WTO sys-
tem has seen “great success” in securing compliance with its agreements. Id. 
at 161–211. For a discussion of how and why the WTO’s method works, see 
generally Gregory Shaffer, A Structural Theory of WTO Dispute Settlement: 
Why Institutional Choice Lies at the Center of the GMO Case, 41 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 1 (2008) (explaining how the WTO’s “comparative institution 
analytic frame” functions and serves to accommodate differences between 
state laws in dispute resolution). 
 16. In this Note, as in current discussion of sanctions, “sending state” or 
“sender” refers to the state enacting and/or enforcing the sanctions against 
another state or entity, called the “target.” See Hufbauer & Oegg, supra note 
12, at 305 n.2. 
 17. Cora True-Frost, The Development of Individual Standing in Interna-
tional Security, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1183, 1187 n.8 (2011). Examples of such 
litigation are discussed in Part I.B. 
 18. Weschler, supra note 11, at 40; see infra note 67 and accompanying 
text. 
 19. True-Frost, supra note 17, at 1215–16. 
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with the serious lack of due process and transparency inherent 
in [the targeted sanctioning as a whole].”20 
Although questions surrounding the legality of using targeted 
economic sanctions as a weapon against terrorism remains un-
resolved, the Magnitsky Act and Yakolev’s Law demonstrate 
that the use of targeted economic sanctions is expanding from 
the context of terrorism to that of human rights violations, pro-
ducing new difficulties in the international legal sphere. This 
Note argues that collective targeted sanctions against suspect-
ed terrorists are theoretically and practically different from a 
state’s unilateral use of targeted sanctions against a foreign 
national suspected of violating international human rights law 
because the latter directly violates a state’s sovereignty as well 
as the individual’s due process rights. Therefore, international 
actors must approach the two situations differently, and there-
by bring themselves into relative compliance with international 
law. Part I of this Note describes general sanctions regimes and 
targeted sanctions, their differences, and how the principles of 
universal jurisdiction, state sovereignty, and individual rights 
are implicated by the use of targeted sanctions. Part II argues 
that using targeted sanctions against individuals affiliated 
with a recognized state government (as opposed to non-state 
groups, such as terrorist organizations), infringes on the target 
state’s exclusive internal jurisdiction, in violation of interna-
tional law. It also explains how targeted sanctions may, and 
often do, violate individuals’ due process rights. Part III sug-
gests that, given its unique position in the international legal 
system, the U.N. is obligated to protect both types of rights, 
and further recommends that the U.N. protect those rights by 
regulating the use of unilateral targeted sanctions by member 
states. 
I. BACKGROUND 
To understand targeted sanctions, it is necessary to under-
stand their origins, the principles of international law that 
permit or restrict their use, and the impetus behind the inter-
                                                                                                             
 20. Adeno Addis, Targeted Sanctions as a Counterterrorism Strategy, 19 
TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 187, 197 (2010); see also True-Frost, supra note 17, at 
1243 (concluding that, even if the U.N.’s new procedures for review do not 
actually ensure a fair hearing, people benefit from perceiving that their 
rights are protected). 
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national community’s ongoing struggle to find a perfect ap-
proach. Here, “general sanctions” will refer to the traditional 
concept of sanctions employed in the twentieth century: a com-
bination of economic measures directed against a target gov-
ernment. Targeted sanctions (specific measures against indi-
viduals, as opposed to against the government) were originally 
one branch of these general sanctions regimes—in other words, 
one piece of the overall plan. They have since grown, as out-
lined below. 
A. Description and History of Economic Sanctions 
Sanctions—a major instrument of international relations21—
are varied, complex, and ill-defined.22 This Note focuses on eco-
nomic sanctions,23 which Professors W. Michael Reisman and 
Douglas L. Stevick described as “involv[ing] a purposive threat 
or actual granting or withholding of economic indulgences, op-
portunities, and benefits by one actor or group of actors in or-
der to induce another actor or group of actors to change a poli-
cy.”24 In theory, these measures would impose sufficient costs 
on the target state’s government to effect that change.25 Eco-
nomic sanctions include trade restrictions, embargoes, blocks 
                                                                                                             
 21. W. Michael Reisman & Douglas L. Stevick, The Applicability of Inter-
national Law Standards to United Nations Economic Sanctions Programmes, 
9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 86, 87 (1998). 
 22. See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND U.S. TRADE 11–16 
(1990); see also LOWENFELD, supra note 15, at 850. Some scholars hold that if 
a state revokes a benefit it previously conferred, this too would constitute a 
sanction, while others consider this a neutral practice not within the purview 
of the term “sanction.” In a similar vein, the International Monetary Fund 
has denied states access to its funds for limited types of misconduct while 
maintaining that such denial is not an economic “sanction.” Id. 
 23. Sanctions may also consist of military (involving the use of armed 
force), diplomatic (political admonishments), or ideological (propaganda) 
measures. Reisman, supra note 14, at 10–11. 
 24. Reisman & Stevick, supra note 21, at 87. 
 25. A. Cooper Drury, Revisiting Economic Sanctions Considered, 35 J. 
PEACE RES. 497, 508 (1998); see also Michael Ewing-Chow, First Do No Harm: 
Myanmar Trade Sanctions and Human Rights, 5 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 
153, 153 (2007) (criticizing the theory as “too simplistic a view that does not 
take into account the likelihood of such an event based on the history, culture 
and power differential of each country”). 
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on monetary loans, suspending economic assistance, and travel 
restrictions (such as visa bans).26 
All sanctions begin with a plan by the sending state. Multiple 
sender states may unite to negotiate a multilateral agreement 
or collective decision in an international organization to enforce 
a regime of sanctions against a target state.27 With a few ex-
ceptions,28 collective sanctions regimes are on the rise. Since 
2000, the EU has initiated and collaborated on more sanctions 
regimes than any other international organization; the U.N. 
comes in second, having played a major role in six out of seven-
teen major sanctions regimes since 2000.29 States may, though 
less frequently do, attempt to unilaterally sanction another 
state.30 
i. General Economic Sanctions 
Traditionally, general sanctions target the state as a whole in 
order to reach the target state’s government.31 The theory is 
that the sender’s actions will cause sufficient hardship in the 
target state, such that the target’s government will alter its 
behavior.32 The sanctioning measures were purportedly pre-
                                                                                                             
 26. Richard N. Haass, Introduction to COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1, 2 (Richard N. Haass ed., 
1998). 
 27. LOWENFELD, supra note 15, at 849. 
 28. The furthest outlier is the United States, which uses unilateral sanc-
tions more frequently than any other state, in addition to participating in 
multilateral and collective sanctions regimes. Hufbauer, supra note 14. 
 29. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott & Julia 
Muir, Post-2000 Sanctions Episodes, PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMICS (May 2012), http://www.piie.com/publications/papers/sanctions-
timeline-post-2000.pdf. 
 30. Hufbauer, supra note 14. 
 31. Sarabeth Egle, The Learning Curve of Sanctions—Have Three Decades 
of Sanctions Reform Taught Us Anything?, 19 CURRENTS INT’L TRADE L.J. 34, 
37 (2011). 
 32. See THOMAS J. BIERSTEKER & SUE E. ECKERT, WATSON INST. TARGETED 
SANCTIONS PROJECT, STRENGTHENING TARGETED SANCTIONS THROUGH FAIR AND 
CLEAR PROCEDURES 5 (2006), 
http://watsoninstitute.org/pub/Strengthening_Targeted_Sanctions.pdf. Ana-
lysts ascribe to sanctions a number of purposes: to express disapproval, to 
punish, and to effect change; see also Roger Normand & Christoph Wilcke, 
Human Rights, Sanctions, and Terrorist Threats: The United Nations Sanc-
tions Against Iraq, 11 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 299, 304–05 (2001). 
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ventative, not punitive.33 Desired changes include removal of a 
leader or party, reorganization of governmental structure (usu-
ally toward democracy), cessation of nuclear testing, and great-
er protection for human rights, etc.34 For example, in response 
to the human rights abuses and seemingly nondemocratic elec-
tions in Haiti in 2000, the United States cut financial assis-
tance to the country, and the EU temporarily halted economic 
aid. Aid was restored incrementally from 2004 to 2006, follow-
ing the previous leader’s removal and the occurrence new elec-
tions.35 This “withdrawal of a current preference” is not viola-
tive of international law (and by some definitions, not a sanc-
tion at all).36 
General economic sanctions owe a large part of their popular-
ity to the perception that they are peaceful, “seem[ing] to offer 
wholly non-violent and non-destructive ways of implementing 
international policy.”37 Also, they can be inexpensively execut-
ed and thus gain domestic support easily.38 
                                                                                                             
 33. The U.N. General Assembly formally stated that “the purpose of sanc-
tions is to modify the behaviour [sic] of a party that is threatening interna-
tional peace and security and not to punish or otherwise exact retribution.” 
U.N. Secretary-General, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper 
of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the 
United Nations, ¶ 66, U.N. Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1 (Jan. 25, 1995). This per-
spective, common among sending parties, is not widely held in the scholarly 
community, which tends to focus on the ad hoc, coercive nature of sanctions. 
See, e.g., Normand & Wilcke, supra note 32, at 305; and Vanessa Ortblad, 
Comment, Criminal Prosecution in Sheep’s Clothing: The Punitive Effects of 
OFAC Freezing Sanctions, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1439 (2008) (criticiz-
ing the low evidentiary standards used to place individuals on terrorism 
blacklists in the United States). 
 34. PETERSON INST. INT’L ECON., Case Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism: 
Summary of Economic Sanctions Episodes, 1914–2006, 
http://www.piie.com/research/topics/sanctions/sanctions-timeline.cfm (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Economic Sanctions 1914–2006]. 
 35. This sanctions episode received a score of nine out of twelve on the Pe-
terson Institute’s effectiveness scale, indicating the Peterson analysts consid-
er it an unusually successful example of economic sanctions implementation. 
Hufbauer et al., supra note 29, at 1. 
 36. See MALLOY, supra note 22, at 18. 
 37. Reisman & Stevick, supra note 21, at 94. 
 38. Id. at 94. Another factor resulting in the increased use of sanctions 
may have been the increased activity of “single-issue constituencies” like 
nongovernmental organizations, known for demanding governmental atten-
tion to specific issues “when no equally focused countervailing force exist[ed]” 
and thus influencing foreign policy. Haass, supra note 26, at 3. 
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In practice, general sanctions suffer two major drawbacks.39 
First, their success rates are dubious; answers to questions of 
their effectiveness range from “yes, approximately one-third of 
the time,”40 to “rarely,” and “no.”41 In past sanctions episodes, 
the targeted government often managed to substantially evade 
the measures taken against it, since “globalization . . . made it 
easier for target countries to tap international trade and capi-
tal markets and find alternative suppliers of goods and capi-
tal.”42 Unilateral sanctions are particularly ineffective.43 As of 
early 2013, any apparent success is hard to qualify and quanti-
fy, making the effects of economic sanctions difficult to assess.44 
Second, sanctions can cause harm to innocent civilians in the 
receiving state.45 Indeed, sometimes—often enough to incite 
anger in the international community—the receiving state’s 
                                                                                                             
 39. Analysts have identified additional potential effects of sanctions. Gary 
Clyde Hufbauer and Barbara Oegg contend that economic sanctions may 
marginally depress the sending state’s trade, but “individual firms and com-
munities in the sending countries may experience severe economic disloca-
tion,” and the effects on a state’s foreign investment may be dramatic. 
Hufbauer & Oegg, supra note 12, at 314. They also consider the difference in 
means of enforcement of sanctions, observing that “economic sanctions im-
posed by the public sector pose a relatively limited threat . . . . On the other 
hand, private litigation . . . carries an enormous potential to limit trade and 
capital flows between developed and developing countries.” Id. at 328. See 
generally Kimberly Ann Elliott, Evidence on the Costs and Benefits of Eco-
nomic Sanctions, PETERSON INST. INT’L ECON. (Oct. 23, 1997), 
http://www.piie.com/publications/testimony/testimony.cfm?ResearchID=294 
(breaking down the economic costs and benefits of U.S. sanctions, concluding 
that sanctions may be “costing the United States $15 billion to $19 billion 
annually in potential exports”). 
 40. See Hufbauer & Oegg, supra note 12, at 307; accord David Lektzian & 
Mark Souva, An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success, 51 J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 848, 848 (2007) (citing GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, JEFFREY J. 
SCHOTT & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: 
HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 
(1990)). 
 41. Marinov, supra note 13, at 565 (offering a notably positive assessment 
of economic sanctions’ ability to induce change by destabilizing targeted lead-
ers). 
 42. Jeffrey J. Schott, US Economic Sanctions: Good Intentions, Bad Execu-
tion, PETERSON INST. INT’L ECON. (Jun. 3, 1998), 
http://www.piie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=314. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Marinov, supra note 13, at 565. 
 45. Grant L. Willis, Security Council Targeted Sanctions, Due Process and 
the 1267 Ombudsperson, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 673, 678 (2011). 
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population suffers greatly despite senders’ attempts to protect 
basic necessities of life and provide humanitarian aid.46 Alt-
hough not the norm,47 such devastating cases commanded in-
ternational attention.48 Owing to the centralization of govern-
mental power in many targeted nations, civilian populations 
can feel the sting of sanctions first and to the greatest degree 
because “[t]hose who have no voice in the allocation of re-
sources are the most dependent on them.”49 These humanitari-
an problems have been dubbed “collateral damages.”50 
An infamous general sanctions regime that was both disas-
trously harmful and woefully ineffective was the U.N. and 
United States’ concerted attack on Iraq in the 1990s.51 In re-
sponse to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Iraq’s refusal to 
comply with previous Security Council demands, the Security 
Council imposed a near-total ban on Iraqi imports and ex-
ports.52 This ban lasted from 1990 to 1997, when trade re-
strictions were relaxed under the Oil-for-Food Program, only to 
be tightened again in 2001.53 Deprived of important trade, the 
Iraqi economy ground to a halt.54 Civilians faced unemploy-
ment, malnourishment, and disease while “the very wealthy, 
those politically connected to the regime, and the political lead-
ership itself . . . remained largely immune to the shortages of 
food and consumer goods.”55 Limited humanitarian aid was “far 
from perfect and led to one of the most extensive outside re-
views of any of the UN’s activities . . . .”56 The sanctions against 
                                                                                                             
 46. Weschler, supra note 11, at 37. 
 47. See Hufbauer & Oegg, supra note 12, at 315 (“[I]n terms of economic 
costs of sanctions to target countries, the comprehensive UN sanctions re-
gime against Iraq is a clear outlier.”). 
 48. David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Introduction to SANCTIONS AND THE 
SEARCH FOR SECURITY: CHALLENGES TO UN ACTION 1 (David Cortright & 
George A. Lopez eds., 2002) [hereinafter Cortright & Lopez, SEARCH FOR 
SECURITY]. 
 49. Normand & Wilcke, supra note 32, at 313; see also Eric D. K. Melby, 
Iraq in COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN 
DIPLOMACY, supra note 26, at 107, 112 (detailing the economic effects on 
Iraq). 
 50. Reisman & Stevick, supra note 21, at 92. 
 51. Melby, supra note 49. 
 52. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug 6, 1990). 
 53. Normand & Wilcke, supra note 32, at 310. 
 54. Id. at 311. 
 55. Id. at 311–15. 
 56. Weschler, supra note 11, at 37. 
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Iraq proved to be both harmful and largely ineffective at desta-
bilizing the government of Saddam Hussein.57 In retrospect, 
this sanctions episode has been decried as blatantly violative of 
international law.58 
ii. The Advent of Targeted Sanctions 
Targeted sanctions were an attempt to solve the problems of 
humanitarian “collateral damage” and general ineffectiveness 
prevalent in comprehensive sanctions regimes and broadly ap-
plied economic restrictions.59 As stated earlier, targeted sanc-
tions “are measures that are designed and implemented in 
such a way as to affect only those parties that are held respon-
sible for wrongful, unacceptable, illegal, or reprehensible be-
havior”—meaning individuals, legal entities, and other non-
state actors.60 A refinement of the general sanctions concept, 
targeted sanctions are implemented by national legislation, au-
thorizing the appropriate governmental body to freeze the as-
sets of a selected individual and prohibit his travel within the 
sanctioning state.61 
Targeted sanctions, initially used in combination with other 
sanctioning measures,62 are theorized to substantially reduce 
the amount of collateral damage incidental to a general sanc-
tions regime.63 Additionally, because targets are selected on the 
basis of an individual’s actions (for example, engaging in ter-
rorism or piracy), targeted sanctions can be used to hold non-
state actors accountable for their actions without emphasizing 
                                                                                                             
 57. Economic Sanctions 1914–2006, supra note 34. 
 58. Some commentators contend that the sanctioning parties’ activity in 
Iraq amounted to war crimes. For a philosophical analysis of this opinion, see 
Joy Gordon, When Intent Makes All the Difference in the World: Economic 
Sanctions on Iraq and the Accusation of Genocide, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. 
L.J. 57 (2002). 
 59. Cortright & Lopez, SEARCH FOR SECURITY, supra note 48, at 4. 
 60. de Vries, supra note 10. 
 61. See Andrew Hudson, Not a Great Asset: The UN Security Council’s 
Counter-Terrorism Regime: Violating Human Rights, 25 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
203, 208–09 (2007) (referring to the multilateral 1267 procedures). Logically, 
unilateral targeted sanctions such as the Magnitsky Act and Yakolev’s Law 
are also implemented by national legislation. 
 62. Peter L. Fitzgerald, Smarter “Smart” Sanctions, 26 PENN ST. INT’L L. 
REV. 37, 38 n.5 (2007). 
 63. Addis, supra note 20, at 192 n.22 (2010). 
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affiliation to a state or geographical region.64 Thus, targeted 
sanctions have been designed to allow sanctioning parties to 
manipulate the effects of a measure (such as financial controls) 
to simultaneously narrow its scope and increase its intensity.65 
In practice, however, the procedures associated with targeted 
sanctions are inadequate. This was particularly true of the 
U.N. Security Council’s Resolution 1267, which targeted indi-
viduals suspected of supporting terrorism (outlined in detail in 
Part I.B).66 Analysts and scholars sharply criticized the Securi-
ty Council for this, and many academic conferences were con-
vened to dissect the Security Council’s methods.67 Their major 
concern was a targeted individual’s right to due process under 
international law.68 Individuals who found themselves unex-
pectedly denied access to their property and deemed a terrorist 
brought numerous cases before national and regional courts in 
which they had standing, drawing international attention.69 In 
response, the Security Council created the office of an Ombud-
sperson to independently review the basis for each individual’s 
placement on the list.70 The establishment of this office moder-
                                                                                                             
 64. Peter L. Fitzgerald, “If Property Rights Were Treated Like Human 
Rights, They Could Never Get Away with This”: Blacklisting and Due Process 
in U.S. Economic Sanctions Programs, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 73, 107 (1999). 
 65. Kimberly Ann Elliott, Analyzing the Effects of Targeted Sanctions, in 
SMART SANCTIONS: TARGETING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT supra note 10, at 171. 
 66. Addis, supra note 20, at 193–94; see, e.g., Joined Cases C-402/05 and C-
415/05, Kadi & Al Barakaat v. Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. I-06351 (2008). 
 67. Weschler, supra note 11, at 40. The reports themselves are available 
on the Swiss Confederation State Secretariat for Economic Affairs’ website. 
See Archive of Documents on Targeted Sanctions, STATE SECRETARIAT ECON. 
AFFAIRS (June 17, 2005) 
http://www.seco.admin.ch/themen/00513/00620/00639/00641/index.html?lang
=en. 
 68. Willis, supra note 45, at 675. The discussion regarding Security Coun-
cil sanctions’ effects on human rights is expansive and ongoing. See, e.g., Pa-
draic Foran, Why Human Rights Confuse the Sanctions Debate: Towards a 
Goal-Sensitive Framework for Evaluating United Nations Security Council 
Sanctions, 4 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV 123 (2009) (arguing that hu-
man rights is an inappropriate justification for the implementation of sanc-
tions); Hudson, supra note 61 (arguing that the 1267 procedures deny the 
right to a fair trial, and that the Security Council is bound to protect that 
right). 
 69. True-Frost, supra note 17, at 1187 n.8. 
 70. Thomas J. Biersteker, Targeted Sanctions and Individual Human 
Rights, 65 INT’L J. 99, 115 (2010); accord True-Frost, supra note 17, at 1215–
16. 
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ately ameliorated the situation.71 Therefore targeted sanctions 
may be a step in the right direction,72 but their main feature—
narrow applicability—is not sufficient by itself to prevent con-
flict with international law. 
B. Current International Law on Targeted Sanctions 
i. Security Council Resolution 1267: Collective Targeted Sanc-
tions Against Suspected Terrorists 
In the late 1990s, as part of its ongoing sanctions regime 
against Iraq, the Security Council used targeted sanctions (as 
noted in Part I.A.i).73 With Resolution 1267,74 the Security 
Council created the Taliban Sanctions Committee (“Commit-
tee”), which maintains “the Consolidated List” of “members of 
the Al-Qaida organization and the Taliban and other individu-
als, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with them.”75 
The legally binding resolution requires each member state to 
freeze the assets (located within the member state’s jurisdic-
tion) of listed individuals or entities and deny those individuals 
entry into the member state’s territory.76 
The listing procedures are logical, but have become compli-
cated as they have grown.77 As of late 2012, member states 
were tasked with proposing names for the Consolidated List to 
the Sanctions Committee, providing  
as much detail as possible on the basis(es) for the listing, in-
cluding: (i) specific information supporting a determination 
that the individual or entity [is a member of a terrorist organ-
                                                                                                             
 71. True-Frost, supra note 17, at 1189. 
 72. Addis, supra note 20. 
 73. Hudson, supra note 61. 
 74. S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999). Subsequent Se-
curity Council resolutions built upon 1267, expanding the list of prohibited 
items and allowing for greater degrees of separation between the sanctioned 
individual and the terrorist organization. 
 75. S.C. Res. 1390, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 (Jan. 16, 2002). 
 76. S.C. Res. 1267, supra note 74; accord Bardo Fassbender, TARGETED 
SANCTIONS AND DUE PROCESS 16 (2006), 
http://www.un.org/law/counsel/Fassbender_study.pdf. 
 77. This is a greatly simplified summary of the procedures. For an accessi-
ble summary with greater depth, see Willis, supra note 45, or  Kalyani Mun-
shani, The Essence of Terrorist Finance: An Empirical Study of the U.N. 
Sanctions Committee and the U.N. Consolidated List, 19 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 
229 (2010). 
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ization or associated with one]; (ii) the nature of the infor-
mation; and (iii) supporting information or documents that 
can be provided,” as well as “details of any connection be-
tween the proposed designee and any currently listed individ-
ual or entity.78  
Once names were added to the Consolidated List, a small team 
oversaw state compliance and reported back to the Commit-
tee.79 The Committee was required to provide ad hoc notice of 
an individual’s listing to the individual’s state, and the Securi-
ty Council beseeched states to “take reasonable steps” to notify 
the individual himself.80 But initially, individuals generally 
had no notice of their addition to the list, nor was there a sim-
ple way to be removed from it.81 
ii. The United States’ Magnitsky Act and Russia’s Yakolev’s 
Law: Unilateral Targeted Sanctions against Human Rights Vi-
olators 
As implied, the primary purpose of the United States’ “Russia 
and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule 
of Law Accountability Act of 2012” was to remove the re-
strictions of the preexisting Jackson-Vanik Amendment and 
establish “permanent normal trade relations” with Russia.82 
The old Jackson-Vanik Amendment was an outdated “Cold 
War relic,”83 but given recent incidents of corruption, political 
prosecution, and human rights abuses in Russia,84 Congress 
                                                                                                             
 78. S.C. Res. 1735, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1735 (Dec. 22, 2006). 
 79. S.C. Res. 1526, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1526 (Jan. 30, 2004). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Hudson, supra note 61, at 221. 
 82. Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule 
of Law Accountability Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–208, §§ 401–406. 
 83. David Harris, Op-Ed., End a Cold War Relic, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/16/opinion/16iht-edharris.html; see 
also Myers & Herszenhorn, supra note 3. In the years after the fall of the 
Soviet Union the restrictions were consistently waived. Yet their mere exist-
ence conflicted with U.S. international obligations when Russia became a 
member of the WTO, which requires free trade between its members. Harris, 
supra. 
 84. The Magnitsky Act portion of the Bill notes Russia’s ratification of the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (“ICCPR”), and the U.N. Convention against Corruption, then alleges 
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was loathe to grant Russia any favors.85 The Magnitsky Act 
was a way for Congress to give with one hand while taking 
with the other. 
The Magnitsky Act requires the president to 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a list of 
each person who the President determines, based on credible 
information . . . is responsible for extrajudicial killings, tor-
ture, or other gross violations of internationally recognized 
human rights committed against individuals seeking to ex-
pose illegal activity carried out by officials of the Government 
of the Russian Federation; or to obtain, exercise, defend, or 
promote internationally recognized human rights and free-
doms . . . or acted as an agent or on behalf of a person in a 
manner relating to [those activities].86 
Specific senators and representatives may propose additional 
names, which are added after presidential review and submis-
sion to the committees.87 The list is to be unclassified and pub-
lished publicly in the Federal Register (unless the president 
shows a need for classification to protect national security in-
terests), but does not mention effecting notice to listed par-
                                                                                                             
numerous violations thereof by the Russian government. Jackson-Vanik Re-
peal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act § 402. 
 85. The lingering support for Jackson-Vanik came from the U.S. Con-
gress’s view of the amendment as “an all-purpose vehicle for expressing oppo-
sition to particular Russian policies.” Harris, supra note 83. The U.S. Execu-
tive Branch has opposed Jackson-Vanik since 1992, id., but it was not until 
the Magnitsky Act appeared that Congress was willing to repeal the amend-
ment. See, Lavrov Calls Magnitsky Act “Demonstrative” Anti-Russian Move, 
RIA NOVOSTI (Feb. 10, 2013), 
http://en.ria.ru/russia/20130210/179328797.html. Russian foreign minister 
Sergei Lavrov commented, “I am strongly convinced that [the Magnitsky Act] 
was designed to show that life is not all honey [for Russia] after the Jackson-
Vanik amendment was abolished.” Id. 
 86. Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountabil-
ity Act § 404. The implementation of targeted sanctions by Congressional 
action is different from other U.S. targeted sanctions, such as those against 
individuals associated with Somali piracy, which were established by execu-
tive order pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. 
See OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, SOMALIA: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW 
ABOUT SANCTIONS AGAINST PERSONS CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONFLICT IN 
SOMALIA 2 (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/somalia.pdf. 
 87. Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountabil-
ity Act § 404. 
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ties.88 A listed individual is prohibited from entering the Unit-
ed States (or has his existing visa revoked).89 His assets are 
frozen; that is, “all transactions in all [of the listed individual’s] 
property and interests in the property” are “[frozen] and pro-
hibit[ed],” to the extent that the property is under U.S. con-
trol.90 The president has discretion to remove an individual 
from the list if he finds that the individual did not engage in 
the aforementioned activities, if “the person has been prosecut-
ed appropriately,” or if “the person has credibly demonstrated a 
significant change in behavior, has paid an appropriate conse-
quence . . . and has credibly committed not to engage in [such 
activities].”91 The Act does not include any means for the indi-
vidual himself to contest his listing, nor does it provide any 
guidance as to what constitutes sufficient “credible infor-
mation.” 
In direct response, the Russian government enacted legisla-
tion titled “On measures against individuals involved in viola-
tions of fundamental human rights and freedoms, the rights 
and freedoms of citizens of the Russian Federation,” known as 
Dima Yakolev’s Law.92 The beginning of the law is similar to 
the Magnitsky Act. Article 1 bans from entering Russia any 
U.S. citizen who violates fundamental rights and freedoms, is 
involved in the commission of “crimes against Russian citizens 
living abroad” either by direct participation or while acting in 
an official capacity, or violates the rights of Russian citizens by 
means of “unfounded and unjust sentences,” “undue legal per-
secution,” or “arbitrary decisions.”93 Article 2 imposes property-
related restrictions94 like those of the Magnitsky Act. The list of 
offenders is to be compiled by “the federal executive branch re-
sponsible for the formulation and implementation of public pol-
                                                                                                             
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. § 405. 
 90. Id. § 406. 
 91. Id. § 404. 
 92. Polnii tekst “zakona Dimi Yakoleva” [Complete Text of “Dima Yakolev’s 
Law”], RIA NOVOSTI (Dec. 21, 2012), 
http://ria.ru/politics/20121221/915806320.html [hereinafter Yakolev’s Law]. 
Dima Yakolev was a Russian “toddler who died of heatstroke in Virginia in 
2008 after his adoptive father left him in a parked car for nine hours.” Her-
szenhorn & Kramer, supra note 8. 
 93. Yakolev’s Law, supra note 92, art. 1. 
 94. Id. art. 2. 
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icy and legal regulation in the sphere of international rela-
tions.”95 
But Yakolev’s Law goes further than its American counter-
part. The Russian law suspends the activity of all non-profit 
organizations that operate in Russia and receive support from 
U.S. entities (citizens or organizations) if the organization’s ac-
tivities are deemed to threaten Russia’s interests.96 U.S. citi-
zens are prohibited from occupying leadership roles in non-
profit organizations as well.97 Most famously, it suspends the 
activities of adoption organizations and prohibits the adoption 
of Russian children by U.S. citizens.98 Yakolev’s Law contains 
no removal provisions, although it does provide for waivers un-
der specific conditions, at the discretion of the aforementioned 
governmental body.99 Overall, the two documents are proce-
durally and substantively similar, creating a list of targeted 
individuals with few procedural safeguards and specious crite-
ria for listing. 
C. Principles of International Law Implicated by Targeted 
Sanctions 
i. State Sovereignty and the Problem of Extraterritoriality 
The objectives of sanctions regimes are antithetical to con-
cepts of sovereignty in international law. Recent scholarship 
has recognized a distinction between state sovereignty (the 
rights and duties of states) and the emerging concept of indi-
vidual sovereignty (the rights of people) under international 
law.100 At times, the two appear to be in contention with each 
other.101 
                                                                                                             
 95. Presumably the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed by Sergei Lavrov. 
Id. 
 96. Id. art. 3. 
 97. Id. art. 2, art. 3. 
 98. Id. art. 4. 
 99. Yakolev’s Law, supra note 92, art. 2. 
 100. Kendall Stiles & Wayne Sandholtz, Cycles of International Norm 
Change, in INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND CYCLES OF CHANGE 323, 335 (Wayne 
Sandholtz & Kendall Stiles eds., 2009). 
 101. Edith Brown Weiss, Rethinking Compliance with International Law, in 
THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 134, 139 (Eyal Benvenisti & Moshe Hirsch eds., 
2004) (describing the rise of “individualist paradigm,” in which “the individu-
al [is] the key participant and sovereign unit in the international system . . . 
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A state’s sovereignty, meaning a state’s “exclusive authority 
over their territory and population” and its equal position in 
regard to other states, is the foundational principle of tradi-
tional international law. 102 One pillar of this sovereignty is a 
state’s exclusive internal jurisdiction—the right to prescribe, 
enforce, and adjudicate disputes arising from actions that have 
sufficient ties to the state itself, free from interference by an-
other state.103 Thus, a state has territorial jurisdiction over 
persons, property, and events existing or occurring within its 
physical boundaries.104 This is the most common, and least con-
troversial, means to assert authority.105 
A state may also exercise jurisdiction extraterritorially, pro-
vided it substantiates its claim with a recognized principle of 
international law.106 After World War II and throughout the 
Cold War, states largely favored the collective action of inter-
national law over extraterritorial action by individual states.107 
In the last twenty years, however, some states have exhibited 
more isolationist tendencies, avoiding the mutual commitments 
of treaties and returning to extraterritorial means to combat 
international issues.108 Extraterritoriality has been called “the 
                                                                                                             
It follows then that we are witnessing the demise of the sovereignty of states 
and the rise of the sovereignty of individuals and the protection of their 
rights . . .”). See also Stiles & Sandholtz, supra note 100, at 336. 
 102. Wayne Sandholtz, Explaining International Norm Change, in 
INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND CYCLES OF CHANGE 1, supra note 100, at 1, 20–21. 
Though this indubitably represents the standard concept of state sovereignty, 
it has been challenged. See, e.g., ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY 
AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 311 (2005); Anne-Marie Slaughter & 
William Burke-White, The Future of International Law Is Domestic (or, The 
European Way of Law), 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 327, 327–28 (2006) (noting that 
this Westphalian view of state sovereignty, in which states are “defined phys-
ical territories,” exclusive and isolated, may no longer be appropriate in the 
wake of globalization). 
 103. Daniel W. Drezner, On the Balance Between International Law and 
Democratic Sovereignty, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 321, 323 (2001). 
 104. BARRY E. CARTER & ALLEN S. WEINER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 640 (6th ed. 
2011). 
 105. CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 42 (2008); see 
id. at 83 (noting that “common law countries have put far more emphasis on 
the territoriality principle than [civil law countries]”). 
 106. RYNGAERT, supra note 105, at 85. 
 107. See Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterri-
toriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. 815, 852–53 (2009). 
 108. Id. at 842–43. 
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greatest affront to democratic sovereignty,” because the send-
ing state is effectively attempting to restrict the receiving 
state’s exercise of its internal authority.109 
That is not to say that all extraterritorial actions are imper-
missible; in fact, several theories exist to justify one state’s in-
volvement in another state’s affairs, to some degree.110 For ex-
ample, a state usually maintains some degree of control over its 
nationals acting outside its territory, a notion known as the 
“personality principle.”111 Treaties, being agreements between 
states prescribing the law between them, may formally confer 
adjudicatory authority, enforcement authority, or both, on one 
or more forums.112 
Neither aforementioned jurisdictional foundation is as con-
troversial as the effects doctrine, which stipulates that a state 
may exercise authority over specific extraterritorial conduct 
that has “substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect[s]” in the 
state, provided the state acts reasonably in light of its own and 
other states’ interests.113 This “reasonableness test” supposedly 
prevents otherwise extraterritorial jurisdiction from running 
afoul of the territoriality principle.114 For example, the United 
                                                                                                             
 109. Id. at 860. Some scholars contend that international law, as an alter-
native to extraterritorial national jurisdiction, is itself an attack on state sov-
ereignty because it restricts states’ exercise of their independent authority. 
Id. 
 110. LOWENFELD, supra note 15, at 901. 
 111. The personality principle may be active (when the national is acting 
abroad) or passive (when the national is being acted upon—usually harmed—
by a non-national abroad). It actually predated the territoriality principle as 
a basis for jurisdiction; the latter, however, surpassed the former in signifi-
cance around the seventeenth century. RYNGAERT, supra note 105, at 47. 
 112. Treaties may confer adjudicative jurisdiction upon national courts ex-
plicitly, or “implicitly oblige[] states to vest their courts with jurisdiction to 
hear claims based on such rules.” ANDRÉ NOLLKAEMPER, NATIONAL COURTS 
AND THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW 35 (2011). 
 113. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 403(2)(a), (g) (1987). 
See also J. Troy Lavers, Extraterritorial Offenses and International Law: The 
Argument for the Use of Comity in Jurisdictional Claims, 14 SW. J.L. & TRADE 
AM. 1, 18 (2007). 
 114. Cf. Lavers at 17. Professor J. Troy Lavers argues that the multifactor 
reasonableness test, as commonly applied in the United States, underempha-
sizes the importance of comity in international relations and “removes the 
requirement of a real and substantial link with the forum state.” Id. at 24. 
Thus the effects doctrine is not necessarily a safe harbor for states exercising 
extraterritorial authority. 
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States has argued that international business affects its do-
mestic economy so greatly that U.S. financial and trade regula-
tions should apply to foreign parties.115 This particular example 
of extraterritorial prescription has been ill-received by the in-
ternational community, but the effects doctrine itself is “the 
linchpin to understanding the geographic reach of domestic 
laws.”116 
Another possible justification is the universality principle,117 
which is commonly invoked to support human rights interven-
tion.118 The universality principle reasons that, if a law is truly 
international, then it binds all states equally.119 One state’s as-
sertion of that law in the territory of another state is not “ex-
traterritorial,” because the law is the same in both locations.120 
However, the shared jurisdiction is not unlimited.121 For exam-
ple, Belgium attempted to use universality to charge foreign 
officials with war crimes, including Yasir Arafat, Fidel Castro, 
Saddam Hussein, and, eventually, George H.W. Bush and oth-
er U.S. officials.122 The U.S. government reacted strongly by 
effectively threatening Belgian interests.123 In this situation 
the Belgian court was applying “universal” international law, 
                                                                                                             
 115. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 251, 269–73 (2006). 
 116. Austen Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality’s Fifth Business, 
61 VAND. L. REV. 1455, 1458 (2008). 
 117. RYNGAERT, supra note 105, at 101. 
 118. Universal jurisdiction is used to justify prosecution of universal crimes, 
a list which currently includes piracy, genocide, torture, and “certain crimes 
of terrorism.” Anthony J. Colangelo, Universal Jurisdiction as an Interna-
tional “False Conflict” of Laws, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 881, 888–89 (2009). 
 119. Id. at 886. 
 120. Id. at 883. 
 121. See RYNGAERT, supra note 105, at 9. “While States are entitled to pre-
scribe laws that govern situations which may be located wholly or partly 
abroad under rules of prescriptive jurisdiction, it is generally accepted that 
they are not entitled to enforce their laws outside their territory, ‘except by 
virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a con-
vention.’” 
 122. Steven R. Ratner, Belgium’s War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 
A.J.I.L. 888, 889–90 (2003). 
 123. The United States’ argument was fairly coercive. Belgium is the host 
state for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”). Then-Secretary of 
State Colin Powell, one of the officials charged, pointed out that he and oth-
ers would be risking arrest if they visited Belgium, therefore NATO would 
have to be relocated. Not wanting to lose its diplomatic position, the Belgian 
government amended its laws. Id. 
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but by convicting absent foreign nationals of those “universal” 
crimes, was extraterritorially asserting its authority to enforce 
and adjudicate that law. 
Conflicting opinions exist regarding the role of territorial 
sovereignty in the international community, but it remains a 
valid and necessary element of international law.124 Some 
scholars support extraterritoriality and believe territorial sov-
ereignty to be an outdated notion, citing globalization and the 
growth of human rights law125 as reasons to dismiss the idea.126 
Yet states and international organizations often reaffirm terri-
torial sovereignty’s importance as a principle in international 
law. For example, the U.N. limits its own influence “in matters 
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state,”127 and the U.N. General Assembly has formally asked 
for the “repeal of unilateral extraterritorial laws that impose 
sanctions on corporations and nationals of other States.”128 
From a domestic perspective, the U.S. judiciary often presumes 
federal legislation to be bounded by the territory of the U.S.129 
Thus, when one looks at the bigger picture, the need for a 
“strong [territorial] nation-state”—the actor in international 
law that commands the most power and is the most accounta-
ble among other actors—is apparent.130 
 
                                                                                                             
 124. Parrish, supra note 116, at 1503–04. 
 125. Fernando R. Teson, Collective Humanitarian Intervention, 17 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 323, 323 (1996). 
 126. See Parrish, supra note 116, at 1469–70; see also Jacob Katz Cogan, 
The Regulatory Turn in International Law, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 321, 322–23 
(2011). But cf. Parrish, supra note 107, at 819–20 (contending that the view 
of extraterritoriality “as an inevitable . . . byproduct of globalization” is unde-
sirable because it overlooks the negative effects of extraterritoriality). 
 127. U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 7. 
 128. G.A. Res. 53/10, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/10 (Nov. 3, 1998). 
 129. John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 
A.J.I.L. 351, 351 (2010). Professor Knox explains that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality is an “offshoot of the Charming Betsy canon,” 
which stipulates that federal legislation should be interpreted so as not to 
conflict with international law, as long as the resulting interpretation is rea-
sonable. If this is so, the reason laws are interpreted not to apply extraterri-
torially is because such an extraterritorial interpretation would conflict with 
international law. Id. at 352. This lends further support to the position that 
territorial sovereignty remains a respected element of international law. 
 130. Austen Parrish, Rehabilitating Territoriality in Human Rights, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1099, 1106 (2011). 
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ii. The Individual Rights to Property and Due Process 
The list of human rights protected by international law has 
grown considerably since World War II.131 Targeted sanctions 
specifically implicate two individual human rights that are con-
ferred by customary international law and recognized by nu-
merous treaties and national legislatures. First is the substan-
tive right to own property, free from interference. Second is the 
procedural right to a fair hearing. If an individual’s property 
right is threatened or violated—or if an individual is charged 
with a crime under international law—that procedural due 
process right is triggered. 
The long-recognized right to own property is codified in many 
treaties. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
(“UDHR”) provides that “[e]veryone has the right to own prop-
erty alone as well as in association with others,” and “[n]o one 
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.”132 The UDHR rec-
ognizes the right to a remedy upon violation of a legally con-
                                                                                                             
 131. See id. at 1114. 
 132. Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR], G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, 
U.N. Doc. A/Res/217(III), at 74 (Dec. 10, 1948). This first piece of the “inter-
national bill of rights” was adopted in the U.N. General Assembly in 1948. 
The UDHR is praised as the basis of human rights in the world today. In ad-
dition to the states party to the UDHR, many are parties to other treaties 
that include principles from the UDHR, and many of those principles have 
been incorporated into domestic constitutions and legislation. Additionally, a 
number of the stipulated rights are treated as rights under customary inter-
national law. Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
287, 289 (1995). There exists a lively debate about the origins of the rights, 
whether they are truly universal, and which if any should be customary in-
ternational law. See, e.g., Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Hu-
man Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUST. 
Y.B.I.L. 82 (1988) (advocating an approach to expanding international human 
rights law that does not rely exclusively on treaty law, but also custom and 
other consensual bases); Tai-Heng Cheng, The Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights at Sixty: Is It Still Right for the United States?, 41 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 251, 255 (2008) (arguing that the rights should be re-evaluated, because 
negotiations were tainted by “attempts to co-opt the Declaration to the ser-
vice of political goals”). The inclusion of UDHR principles in customary inter-
national law has additional significance regarding non-state actors, who 
might not otherwise be bound to respect those rights. See Adam McBeth, Eve-
ry Organ of Society: The Responsibility of Non-State Actors for the Realization 
of Human Rights, 30 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 33, 60 (2008). 
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ferred right.133 The International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights (“ICCPR”), adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 
1966, likewise contains a provision codifying an individual’s 
right to due process if faced with a criminal charge, including 
specifically the rights to “a fair and public hearing by a compe-
tent, independent and impartial tribunal,” to notice of the 
charges against him, and to an opportunity to defend him-
self.134 
None of these agreements, however, create a venue for indi-
viduals to assert these rights. The classical view of interna-
tional law, in which sovereign states are the principal actors, 
does not confer standing on individuals—they “lack the power 
to set in motion the machinery of international law for sanc-
tioning violations of the obligations international law impos-
es.”135 The individual must rely on a state to defend his rights 
and, if the state is successful, he can only reap the benefits sec-
ondarily.136 Yet individuals may be prosecuted for violating in-
ternational law (as seen in the prosecution of officials for war 
crimes in the Nuremburg trials).137 This creates an “asym-
metry” in the system.138 
Most doors to adjudication of international law claims are 
closed to individuals. National courts are responsible for en-
forcing most of international law,139 but the ability of those 
courts’ to adjudicate—and individuals’ ability to access them—
is limited by the courts’ jurisdiction.140 Treaties rarely specifi-
                                                                                                             
 133. “Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent na-
tional tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the 
constitution or by law.” UDHR, supra note 132, at 73. 
 134. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR], G.A. 
Res. 2200 (XXI) A, Annex, at 54, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200 (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966). 
 135. Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Indi-
viduals, 92 COLUM. L. REV 1082, 1087 (1992). 
 136. In a recent example, Switzerland came to the aid of two of its citizens. 
Professor Mohamend Mansour and his wife were added to the Resolution 
1267 Consolidated List by the U.S. in 2001. After Switzerland negotiated 
with the Security Council on Dr. Mansour’s behalf, the couple was delisted in 
2006. True-Frost, supra note 17, at 1186, 1186 n.5. 
 137. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE 
L.J. 2347, 2378 (1991). 
 138. Addis, supra note 20, at 189–90. 
 139. NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 112, at 25; accord True-Frost, supra note 17, 
at 1188–89. 
 140. True-Frost, supra note 17, at 1188. 
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cally confer jurisdiction on national courts.141 Meanwhile the 
few international courts, such as the International Court of 
Justice (“ICJ”)142 and International Criminal Court (“ICC”), 
have very limited jurisdiction.143 To bring his claim, the ag-
grieved individual must navigate the complex system of inter-
national adjudicative jurisdiction—if the combination of theo-
ries, codified law, and exceptions can be called a system—to 
access an appropriate national or international forum, if one 
can be found. 
II. APPLICATION OF THOSE PRINCIPLES TO TARGETED 
SANCTIONS 
A. Unilateral Use of Targeted Sanctions by States in Violation 
of International Law 
The three types of legislation outlined in Part I—the U.N. Se-
curity Council’s Resolution 1267, the United States’ Magnitsky 
Act, and Russia’s Yakolev’s Law—are fundamentally different 
examples of targeted economic sanctions. Although theoretical-
ly permissible under international law, the U.N.-supported, 
state-implemented targeted sanctions against terrorists consti-
tute a dubious use of targeted sanctions, and arguments sup-
porting unilateral targeted sanctions are even less tenable. 
Terrorist supporters present novel problems, such as the ac-
countability of non-state organizations,144 but the misconduct of 
                                                                                                             
 141. NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 112, at 35. 
 142. Only states may be parties in ICJ adjudications. Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice art. 34, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 
993. 
 143. Parrish, supra note 107, at 833 n.80 (citing Curtis A. Bradley & Jack 
L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights Liti-
gation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 458 (1997)). 
 144. Sarah E. Smith, Blaming Big Brother: Holding States Accountable for 
the Devastation of Terrorism, 56 Okla. L. Rev. 735, 739 (2003) (describing 
terrorists’ lack of “political status” and imperviousness to traditional sanc-
tions); see also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DISCOURAGING TERRORISM: SOME 
IMPLICATIONS OF 9/11, at 16 (Neil J. Smelser & Faith Mitchell eds., 2002) 
[hereinafter DISCOURAGING TERRORISM]. Terrorism is comparable to piracy, 
the crime that the universality principle was originally conceived to combat. 
See Colangelo, supra note 118, at 898. Interestingly, “terrorism” is cited as 
having governmental roots, beginning with the French government and the 
French Revolution. Reuven Young, Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Ter-
rorism as a Legal Concept in International Law and Its Influence on Defini-
tions in Domestic Legislation, 29 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 23, 27–28 (2006). 
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human rights violators does not. Indeed, since the Nuremburg 
trials, there have been increasing instances of individuals held 
personally accountable for violations of international human 
rights.145 Therefore the governing principles of international 
law are firmly established, and need only be applied to the case 
at hand. 
i. The Lack of Justification for Extraterritoriality 
Differences in the criminal acts at issue generate relevant 
distinctions between unilateral and multilateral targeted sanc-
tions. “[T]he crime creates jurisdiction,” such that the legitima-
cy of extraterritorial prescription and enforcement often de-
pends upon the prescription at issue.146 Both terrorism and 
human rights violations as described in the Magnitsky Act and 
Yakolev’s Law (torture and inhumane treatment) are recog-
nized as crimes under international law.147 Therefore in all of 
those cases, the sanctioning parties are not prescribing the law 
in a foreign territory, but rather, merely seek to adjudicate and 
enforce those laws.148 
Due to the nature of the terrorist organization, it is uncertain 
whether targeting suspected terrorists necessarily runs afoul of 
state sovereignty. Definitions of terrorism focus on the individ-
ual perpetrator and his liability, rather than the state that 
(knowingly or unknowingly) hosts him.149 Such non-state or-
ganizations do not possess the “attributes of statehood,” there-
fore targeting individuals associated with those organizations 
is not necessarily violative of state sovereignty.150 To the extent 
                                                                                                             
 145. See Koh, supra note 137, at 2378. 
 146. Colangelo, supra note 118, at 891 (referring to jurisdiction under the 
universality principle). 
 147. Id. at 888; accord UDHR, supra note 132, at 73. The specific incidents 
described in relation to each statute are presumed, if true, to constitute a 
violation of human rights. 
 148. See RYNGAERT, supra note 105, at 9–10 (outlining the differences be-
tween the three types of jurisdiction). 
 149. See Fassbender, supra note 76, at 4 (noting that “after the Taliban 
were removed from power in Afghanistan, there is no particular link between 
the targeted individuals and entities and a specific country”); see also Young, 
supra note 144, at 61–62, 64 (“Group action or involvement is not a require-
ment, but the act must be perpetrated by a sub-state actor.”). 
 150. Cf. Smith, supra note 144, at 739. That is not to say there is no connec-
tion between sovereign states and terrorist organizations, because the organ-
izations necessarily exist within sovereign states. States that are themselves 
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that targeted sanctions (whether multilateral or unilateral) do 
threaten state sovereignty, the effects doctrine may justify 
their use. The substantial effects of terrorist attacks are often 
felt beyond the borders of the terrorists’ host state.151 
Conversely, the human rights violators of the Magnitsky Act 
and Yakolev’s Law are identified by their activities within their 
home states.152 In this situation, the universality principle does 
not permit unilateral state action. As described in Part I.C, if 
the crime being prosecuted is truly international, the sending 
state’s exercise of authority seems to be not truly extraterrito-
rial because it and the receiving state theoretically have identi-
cal laws.153 Thus, the sending state is not “thwarting choices by 
the target state that must remain free under international 
law.”154 However, prescription of law and enforcement of law 
                                                                                                             
thoroughly terrorist may exist, and “the flexibility involved in holding terror-
ist States accountable has also provided significant basis to shift the interna-
tional community’s focus away from terrorists to their State sponsors.” Id. at 
739. However, “it is logical that more States merely tolerate terrorist organi-
zations than actively participate in State-sponsorship of terrorism.” Id. at 
742. But cf. DISCOURAGING TERRORISM, supra note 144, at 23 (emphasizing 
state involvement with terrorist organizations to further the state’s own po-
litical ends). A state that supported terrorism would be itself in violation of 
international law, implicating international law on state-to-state relations, 
which is different from and beyond the scope of the argument presented here. 
 151. “Although a significant proportion of terrorism is intrastate, terrorism 
is frequently international in character: by crossing borders (as in Kashmir), 
by the nationality of the participant and/or victim (as in September 11), or by 
target despite being geographically intra-state (for example, attacks on for-
eign visitors in Bali by Indonesia-based terrorists).” Young, supra note 144, 
at 31. 
 152. Both legislative acts specify the nationality of the individuals to be 
targeted for human rights violations. The U.S. legislation specifically targets 
persons who violate the human rights of “individuals seeking to expose illegal 
activity carried out by officials of the Government of Russian Federation; or 
obtain, exercise, defend or promote internationally recognized human rights 
and freedoms . . . .” Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei 
Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–208, § 
404. Given the statute’s reference to numerous events in which the Russian 
government allegedly restricted those “recognized human rights and free-
doms,” the obvious implication is that the statute applies to Russians. Alter-
natively, Senator Ben Cardin (a major proponent of the Bill) has stated that 
the statute has broader reach. “This bill is our standard,” he told the New 
York Times, and “[t]he world is on notice.” Peters, supra note 3. 
 153. See Colangelo, supra note 118, at 895. 
 154. Summarizing the ICJ’s criteria for defining “acts of prohibited inter-
vention.” Teson, supra note 126, at 325. 
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are separate and distinct powers.155 Though both the United 
States and Russia appear to agree on the criminality of the al-
leged conduct by their respective nationals,156 each maintains a 
right to determine how to address the crime within its own 
borders. International law even appears to recognize a hierar-
chy of state interests in prosecution of universal crimes: states 
with territorial or national jurisdiction have “jurisdictional pri-
ority” to adjudicate and enforce international law, over states 
with universal jurisdiction.157 
Nor does the effects doctrine justify the unilateral actions. 
The crimes punished by the Magnitsky Act—the torture and 
death of Sergei Magnitsky and similar political dissidents—had 
no tangible effect on U.S. citizens, property, economy, or other 
interest. Whether abuse of Russian children by U.S. citizens on 
U.S. territory has a substantial effect on Russian interests is 
debatable; however, because Dima Yakolev was a Russian na-
tional, the personality principle could justify Yakolev’s Law as 
the state may protect its nationals abroad. 
ii. Protection of the Individual Right to Due Process 
By requiring targeted sanctions against suspected terrorists, 
Security Council Resolution 1267 created due process problems 
                                                                                                             
 155. Karinne Coombes, Universal Jurisdiction: A Means to End Impunity or 
a Threat to Friendly International Relations?, 43 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 
419, 423–24 (2011); see RYNGAERT, supra note 105, at 9–10. 
 156. Both the United States and Russia have held their citizens accountable 
for the crimes, to some degree. For example, two Russian doctors were indict-
ed for their participation in the lack of medical treatment in prison that al-
legedly caused the death of Sergei Magnitsky. Andrew E. Kramer, Russian 
Acquittal Escalates Human Rights Feud with U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/29/world/europe/russian-acquittal-
escalates-human-rights-feud-with-us.html. The Russian prosecutor dismissed 
charges against one, while the other was acquitted. Id. Dmitri (“Dima”) 
Yakolev’s adoptive American father was indicted for involuntary manslaugh-
ter in the United States—and also acquitted. Ellen Barry, Russian Furor 
Over U.S. Adoptions Follows American’s Acquittal in Boy’s Death, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 4, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/world/europe/04adopt.html. 
 157. “Perhaps an appropriate model here . . . is a complementary jurisdic-
tion similar to that contained in the Rome Statute for the International Crim-
inal Court, which precludes jurisdiction by the ICC where States with territo-
rial or national links to the crime prosecute in good faith.” Colangelo, supra 
note 118, at 900–1. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 
17, opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
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and raised novel issues of U.N. accountability.158 As described 
in Part I.C, initially only an individual who had citizenship of, 
or was physically located in, a sanctioning state had a cause of 
action for his property deprivation by that government.159 One 
possible justification for this lack of process might have been 
that the consequences of terrorism qualified as “emergencies” 
under the ICCPR, which stipulates that an individual’s right to 
trial is not absolute and may be suspended in certain situa-
tions.160 However, the Ombudsperson represents, at the very 
least, U.N. recognition of the due process problem and an at-
tempt to solve it.161 
Currently, no procedural protection for targets of unilateral 
sanctions exists. As described previously, an individual target-
ed by the Magnitsky Act or Yakolev’s Law has no ability to con-
test his placement on the government’s list.162 Since judicial 
standing requires a substantial connection with the adjudicato-
                                                                                                             
 158. See supra Part I.C.ii. 
 159. Courts expanded their jurisdiction to include temporary residence in 
state-controlled camps abroad, perhaps to address this inequity. See, e.g., Al-
Jedda v. U.K., App. No. 27021/08, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 637 (2011) (relating that a 
former immigrant to the United Kingdom, whose citizenship had been re-
voked, fell under U.K. jurisdiction by virtue of internment in U.K. military 
facility abroad); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding that in-
ternees at Guantanamo Bay, the U.S. detention center in Cuba, were subject 
to the U.S. Constitution and thus could bring federal habeas corpus petitions 
to contest their detentions). 
 160. True-Frost, supra note 17, at 1203; see ICCPR, supra note 134, at 53, 
54. The European Court of First Instance took a similar position, stating that 
“the [individuals’] interest in having a court hear their case on its merits is 
not enough to outweigh the essential public interest in the maintenance of 
international peace and security in the face of a threat clearly identified . . . .” 
Carmen Draghici, Suspected Terrorists’ Rights between the Fragmentation 
and Merger of Legal Orders: Reflections in the Margin of the Kadi ECJ Ap-
peal Judgment, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 627, 639 (2009). The Euro-
pean Community Treaty permits no derogation from the right, bringing the 
treaty into conflict with U.N. mandates. European courts and the interna-
tional community remain divided regarding whose legislation takes suprema-
cy. For a thorough discussion of the conflict as it relates to the Kadi case, see 
id. at 649. 
 161. But cf. True-Frost, supra note 17, at 1229–30 (contending that the 
U.N. did not intend to actually provide due process, but rather merely “sig-
nal” respect and desire to protect procedural rights, without allowing itself to 
be held accountable by individuals for breaches of international law). 
 162. See Part I.B, supra. 
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ry body,163 a targeted individual within his home state would 
struggle to access a foreign sender state’s court,164 and the 
travel ban would prevent him from entering the state’s territo-
ry. Furthermore, all removal decisions are wholly committed to 
the discretion of the same subdivision of government that ini-
tially listed the individual.165 
In modern practice, however, individuals have successfully 
brought claims166 arising from codified international law, such 
as a treaty obligation.167 Regardless of whether they are the 
primary actors, as some scholars contend,168 the individuals’ 
ability to seek redress under international law comports with 
the interpretation of international law in which individuals are 
recognized as legitimate actors.169 Thus international law on 
standing has changed significantly. 
III. SOLUTION: GREATER REGULATION, OVERSIGHT, AND 
BINDING SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION 
Provisions governing the use of targeted sanctions must be 
formally regulated by a legitimate, collective, international 
body and must be transformed from an expression of extrater-
ritoriality to one of international law. International law pre-
sents a viable means to safeguard rights worldwide and ad-
                                                                                                             
 163. See Rudolph Lehrer, Unbalancing the Terrorists’ Checkbook: Analysis 
of U.S. Policy in Its Economic War on International Terrorism, 10 TUL. J. 
INT’L. COMP. L. 333, 351 (2002) (citing Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. 
Dep’t of State, 251 F. 3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001), as rare case in which a group 
with U.S. bank accounts and an office in Washington, D.C. was deemed to 
have sufficient connections to the United States to warrant the protection of 
constitutional due process). 
 164. See id. 
 165. See supra  notes 88–89, 93, 97 and accompanying text. 
 166. Here referring to claims brought to a judiciary for litigation, as it is 
most common, though sometimes other remedies are available. See generally 
NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 112, at 37. 
 167. Vazquez, supra note 135, at 1093. 
 168. Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States,   
 169. See Vazquez, supra note 135, at 1094–95. This can be inferred from 
much of the scholarship cited herein. As Professor Adeno Addis described, 
“[t]he Council reaches directly to individuals and private entities for purposes 
of sanctioning them, but without giving those individuals and entities a cor-
responding right of access to it for purposes of challenging the accuracy of the 
basis on which the designation is made.” Addis, supra note 20, at 195. 
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dress issues presented by globalization.170 The alternative, 
“[e]xtraterritorial application of domestic law[,] threatens dem-
ocratic sovereignty in a more profound way than international 
treaties and their institutions.”171 Targeted sanctions may yet 
prove to be a valuable tool for influencing the behavior of select 
individuals with the power to effect the desired change. The 
Security Council should agree upon a regulatory scheme for 
unilateral targeted sanctions, one that accounts for the nature 
of the crime to be prevented or punished and that provides pro-
cedural protection to the targeted individual. 
Unfortunately, it is probable that, left unchecked, stronger 
states will use targeted financial sanctions to pursue their uni-
lateral foreign policy goals, because “[t]he efficiency of asser-
tions of extraterritorial jurisdiction is a function of relative 
power . . . . Powerful States will be able to impose their legisla-
tion on weaker States, while weaker States will almost never 
be able to impose their legislation on more powerful States.”172 
A state’s claim that it is trying to protect the human rights of 
the people within the sanctioned state should not allow them to 
use means that are likewise in violation of international law. 
A. The Basis for the U.N.’s Obligation to States and Individuals 
For most, the U.N. was traditionally viewed as “an autono-
mous subject of international law,” free to exercise its discre-
tion in legal actions.173 In the last two decades, however, “a 
trend can be perceived widening the scope of customary law . . . 
to include direct ‘governmental’ action of international organi-
zations vis-à-vis individuals.”174 The U.N.’s anti-terrorist sanc-
tions “have a direct impact on the rights and freedoms of indi-
viduals.”175 When the Security Council issued Resolution 1267, 
which required states to freeze the assets of foreign individuals 
believed to be supporting terrorism, the U.N. definitively ex-
                                                                                                             
 170. Parrish, supra note 107, at 817 (describing the different perspectives of 
“Sovereigntists” and “modern Internationalists”). 
 171. Id. at 859. 
 172. RYNGAERT, supra note 105, at 34. 
 173. Fassbender, supra note 76. 
 174. Id. at 19; see True-Frost, supra note 17, at 1201. This change is appar-
ent in other international organizations, such as the EU. Fassbender, supra 
note 76, at 18. 
 175. Fassbender, supra note 76, at 22. 
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panded its control over state action, incurring additional obli-
gations to states and individuals.176 
Resolution 1267 is not the only basis for U.N. responsibility 
regarding economic sanctions. From its creation, the U.N. de-
lineated a role for itself that included affirmative efforts to es-
tablish and maintain peace internationally. The purposes of 
the U.N., outlined in Article 1 of the Charter, are as follows: 
To maintain international peace and security, and to that 
end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention 
and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression 
of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to 
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or set-
tlement of international disputes or situations which might 
lead to a breach of the peace . . . .177 
The U.N. likewise committed itself to the protection of human 
rights by codifying those rights in the UHDR and mandating 
active protection of those rights in the “Responsibility to Pro-
tect” declarations.178 It expressed a commitment to defend civil 
and political rights under the ICCPR, which includes a number 
of procedural rights.179 
The U.N. has power over more states and with regard to 
more issues than any other international organization. The Se-
curity Council has the power to definitively regulate state be-
havior, and broad discretion to determine when and how to do 
so.180 Its statutory grant of power allows it to take action where 
it finds “a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of ag-
gression,” the existence of which the Security Council itself de-
termines.181 Once established, the Security Council crafts what 
                                                                                                             
 176. See id. at 19 (analogizing EU expansion and internalization of Member 
States’ rights to recent changes within the U.N. and concluding that “there is 
an increasingly broader basis for referring to the constitutional traditions 
and values common to the Member States of the United Nations as a source 
of U.N. law”). 
 177. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1. 
 178. See generally UDHR, supra note 132, at 73; Saira Mohamed, Taking 
Stock of the Responsibility to Protect, 48 STAN. J INT’L L. 319, 323–24 (2012). 
 179. See generally ICCPR, supra note 134. 
 180. LOWENFELD, supra note 15, at 854–55; see True-Frost, supra note 17, at 
1200. 
 181. U.N. Charter art. 39, para. 1. 
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it considers an appropriate response,182 which is legally binding 
on U.N. member states.183 Despite the difficulty of reaching a 
consensus among its permanent members, the Security Council 
possesses a level of authority unrivaled in international law. 
The U.N.’s obligation also stems from a lack of alternative de-
fenders of rights, because it cannot be assured that self-
interested states will implement the proper procedures and 
regulate themselves.184 The idea that states would willingly 
restrict their actions, presumably for no greater benefit than 
the diplomatic approval for not over-extending themselves, is 
implausible. As the use of unilateral targeted sanctions in-
creases,185 states seem more eager to use these means to pro-
tect their interests. Additionally, states are not always open in 
their use of sanctions against one another, as Professors Reis-
man and Stevick have noted, “[u]nilateral sanctions are often 
used as a unilateral technique in international politics, though 
not necessarily explicitly.”186 The lack of openness in state rela-
tions in this area demands U.N. scrutiny, because “[e]nsuring a 
‘level playing-field,’ with just benefits for every party and for 
the system as a whole, requires the imposition of norms and 
continued regulation.”187 
Finally, control of sanctions by an international organization 
is also necessary to increase sanctions’ general efficiency. Ana-
lysts notice that popularly-supported sanctions, such as collec-
tive and multilateral sanctions, are less likely to be circum-
vented and more likely to have the intended effect than unilat-
eral sanctions, where targets have more alternative providers 
of the goods the sender is restricting.188 Indeed, some argue 
that unilateral sanctions are virtually useless, as discussed in 
Part I.A.189 
                                                                                                             
 182. Id. art. 41. 
 183. See id. art. 48, para. 1. 
 184. “Traditionally States . . . have been regarded as the main potential 
violators of human rights.” Fassbender, supra note 76. 
 185. Lehrer, supra note 163, at 347. 
 186. Reisman & Stevick, supra note 21, at 87. 
 187. Peter Ingram, Procedural Justice and the Problem of Voluntarism, in 3 
THE LEGAL AND MORAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: FREEDOM AND 
TRADE 56, 66 (Geraint Parry, Asif Qureshi & Hillel Steiner eds., 1998). 
 188. Lektzian & Souva, supra note 40, at 850. 
 189. Hufbauer, supra note 14. 
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Agreement can solve the problem of extraterritoriality, or at 
least mitigate its effects,190 whereas unilateral economic sanc-
tions can themselves pose a threat to international peace and 
security.191 Because sanctions are coercive, they often provoke 
retaliation and escalation of disputes.192 Russia’s Yakolev’s 
Law, a direct response to the U.S.’ Magnitsky Act,193 is a per-
fect example of unilateral targeted sanctions exacerbating a 
strained relationship between two states. In comparison, multi-
lateral treaties rarely cause such conflict, because they are the 
“product of negotiation and consent.”194 More direct U.N. in-
volvement may be necessary for the success of international 
law overall.195 
B. Proposed Considerations for a Regulatory Approach 
The simplest solution might be for the Security Council to 
impose severe restrictions, or an outright ban, on states’ use of 
unilateral targeted sanctions; however, this is both impractical 
and undesirable. Member states have already expressed con-
cern over the Security Council’s expansion of its power into the 
realm of targeted sanctions,196 and the permanent members of 
the Security Council would have little reason to surrender this 
popular foreign policy tool. Therefore the regulations must, as 
international law often does, take smaller steps toward greater 
goals. Specificity and certainty on the target lists is a chronic 
problem with targeted sanctions.197 Therefore, regulations 
                                                                                                             
 190. “Two methods to render jurisdictional principles more efficient in de-
limiting spheres of competence, and thus to render the exercise of jurisdiction 
more reasonable at a more intricate level, could be conceived of. Either States 
agree upon a convention that precisely sets out on what ground, for what 
purpose, and under what conditions they could exercise jurisdiction.” 
RYNGAERT, supra note 105, at 135. 
 191. Parrish, supra note 107, at 857–58. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Herszenhorn & Kramer, supra note 9. 
 194. Parrish, supra note 107, at 857–58. 
 195. See Slaughter, supra note 168, at 503. “If, for instance, the primary 
actors in the system are not States, but individuals and groups represented 
by State governments, and international law regulates States without regard 
for such individual and group activity, international legal rules will become 
increasingly irrelevant to State behaviour.” Id. at 504. 
 196. True-Frost, supra note 17, at 1197. 
 197. Fitzgerald, supra note 62, at 41. A mutual definition of “terrorism,” as 
an international crime, also eludes the international community. National 
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ought to establish evidentiary standards for listing and mini-
mum procedural safeguards for individuals. Ideally the Securi-
ty Council would require member state compliance with the 
terms of the regulations; however, should that prove infeasible, 
the General Assembly or a committee thereof could compose a 
guidance document, to “create a framework for further trans-
governmental cooperation.”198 This may even be preferable, be-
cause states, knowing they are not legally bound by the terms, 
may be willing to concede certain points. This would result in a 
more comprehensive and specific document that more accurate-
ly represents the views of the international community. 
The first goal is substantive. It is imperative that the regula-
tions distinguish between types of crimes (be they human 
rights violations, terrorist activities, or others) and types of 
suspected perpetrators.199 The drafters should agree, with as 
much specificity as possible, which types of individuals are de-
serving of targeted sanctions for which types of crimes. Since 
targeted sanctions supposedly work by inducing hardship on 
individuals, such that the individual will perform actions to 
effect the desired change,200 whether an individual has the abil-
ity to cause the change must be considered. 
When considering the citizens of a recognized state, as in the 
cases of unilateral legislation examined here, the target’s role 
in sanctioned government is a crucial determinant of whether 
sanctioning the individual will be effective at influencing the 
receiving government.201 For example, governments that are 
                                                                                                             
and international actors ascribe varying levels of importance to the elements 
of the crime, with substantial overlap, but no meaningful consensus. For an 
informative summary of these issues, see generally Young, supra note 144. 
 198. Slaughter, supra note 168, at 530. “Increased interaction breeds mutu-
al confidence, allowing further interaction to take place on the basis of impre-
cise and open-ended agreements, to be filled in good faith.” Id. 
 199. Fitzgerald, supra note 62, at 52. Professor Fitzgerald considered a sim-
ilar possibility, noting that there has been some effort to make similar dis-
tinctions within U.S. programs. The U.S. Judicial Review Commission sug-
gested “distinguishing between what it called Tier I designees, the primary 
targets of the sanctions, and Tier II designees, those who indirectly deal with 
the targeted parties.” Id. The recognition of “primary” and “secondary” tar-
gets, in the context of sanctions against terrorist supporters, supports the 
proposition a different crime (human rights violations) must be sanctioned 
with different measures as well. 
 200. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 201. See Lektzian & Souva, supra note 40, at 849, 852. 
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more democratic rely heavily on public approval for their pow-
er, whereas political elites dominate less democratic govern-
ments.202 In theory the more democratic government would re-
spond better to non-targeted, broad sanctions,203 while the “de-
cisionmaking elites” of a less democratic government are ap-
propriately singled out with targeted sanctions.204 Since the 
public holds its power in aggregate, there is little to be gained 
by targeting individual members of the public, such as average 
citizens and lower officials of a state. Therefore, regardless of 
whether the government is more or less democratic, the indi-
vidual members of its public are inappropriate targets for sanc-
tions. 
The terrorist organization is a different animal. It is defined 
by its purpose, rather than physical location, and is comprised 
of only its members and assets.205 Its membership is united by 
common ideals and is in a sense voluntary, as compared to citi-
zens who were merely born into a state.206 The organization is a 
close-knit community based on secrecy.207 Therefore, every in-
dividual member or entity is capable of having some effect on 
the terrorist organizations’ activities, and every individual or 
entity may be held accountable to some degree for acts of the 
organization as a whole. Additionally, if correctly applied, fi-
nancial targeted sanctions deprive the organization of its 
means of executing undesirable acts—the prevention of which 
is the sanctions’ purpose.208 In fact, financial targeted sanctions 
seemed well suited for combating terrorist activity, because 
monitoring the assets may provide additional information re-
garding the activities of the terrorists themselves.209 
                                                                                                             
 202. Id. at 852. The failure of general sanctions to affect the powerful elite 
is commonly criticized (as occurred in the case of Iraq). Interlaken I, supra 
note 67, at 6. 
 203. Lektzian & Souva, supra note 40, at 849. 
 204. See Cortright & Lopez, SEARCH FOR SECURITY, supra note 48, at 93. 
 205. DISCOURAGING TERRORISM, supra note 144, at 22–23. 
 206. Cf. id. at 16–17 (describing how terrorists are recruited from no partic-
ular class and, though they often have similar religious and educational his-
tories, each terrorist’s path is different). 
 207. Cf. id. at 22–23. 
 208. See Fitzgerald, supra note 62, at 38 n.4 (quoting the general counsel of 
the U.S. Treasury Department as saying, “[t]he primary source of the stealth 
and mobility necessary [to conduct terrorist acts] is money. . . . If we stop the 
money, we stop the killing”). 
 209. Id. at 40–41. 
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The second goal is procedural: the regulations should include 
a means for targeted individuals to contest their listing. If a 
review committee similar to the office of the Ombudsperson 
were created, states could be required to submit to the commit-
tee their lists of targeted individuals for review, including a 
means for exception upon showing secrecy was necessary to 
protect national security interests. The committee could then 
notify the targeted individuals of the charges against them. 
Preference could be given for pre-deprivation notice, particular-
ly if the alleged crime is a human rights violation. The sending 
state would also benefit from careful review, by saving the 
costs of overseeing compliance of its institutions.210 An excep-
tion could be made for exigent circumstances, because some-
times expedience is necessary, particularly in light of a credible 
threat of terrorist attack.211 In such cases, ad hoc review might 
comport with international law’s “emergency” exception to due 
process. 
CONCLUSION 
The current trend toward numerous and extensive blacklists 
of targeted individuals is a dangerous one, because procedures 
of current international law are failing to keep pace with state 
actors’ expanding unilateral assertions of authority. The rele-
vant principles of international law—state sovereignty and in-
dividual rights—bar such expansion without appropriate pro-
cedural safeguards. Appropriate use of unilateral targeted 
sanctions may yet be feasible, but their legitimacy is dependent 
on particularized inquiries that consider the nature of the al-
leged crime and the role of the targeted individual. Further-
more, international actors must establish a unified approach in 
order to comply with international law, increase the potential 
effectiveness of their efforts, and not antagonize other states. 
The U.N. stands in the best position to instigate and oversee 
this process. If left unchecked, the unilateral targeted sanc-
                                                                                                             
 210. See generally id. (describing the host of difficulties present in ensuring 
domestic parties comply with targeted sanctions). 
 211. Due to money’s liquidity, the asset freeze may be worthless if not exe-
cuted immediately, before the target has an opportunity to transfer his funds. 
Cortright & Lopez, SEARCH FOR SECURITY, supra note 48, at 103 (emphasizing 
that even a few week’s delay to allow the target a chance to comply with the 
provisions, as has been Security Council policy, undermines the effectiveness 
of the sanction). 
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tions trend will do little to prevent terrorist attacks, less to pro-
tect human rights, and much to increase animosity between 
states—in general, they will contravene the very purposes of 
international law. 
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